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Article 7 TEU empowers the Council to suspend certain rights derived from the application of the 
Treaties. The suspension of voting rights in the Council is one such example. This contribution 
examines which other rights can be suspended. It uses sanction theories and a textual and contextual 
analysis of the sanction provision contained in Article 7 TEU to assess the options the Council has, 
and develops guidelines and suggests improvements of the institutional framework for devising 
sanctions. The contribution argues for targeted sanctions against individuals and entities that form the 
political and economic basis of regimes deviating from the fundamental liberal-democratic values. The 
sanction must be tailored to the causes of the deviation in such a way that they can enhance democratic 
pluralism. 
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  1 
Introduction 
The suspension of voting rights of a Member State that seriously and persistently violates the 
fundamental values of our common enterprise is neither the only option nor a desirable one. The EU’s 
discretion in devising sanctions is broad, and its institutions must use their sanctioning powers 
effectively and creatively to stop the proliferation of illiberal structures in its Eastern part before they 
spread further. The EU has the necessary powers to do so, and it is under obligation to its citizens to 
do so. It should start with identifying the economic bases of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and 
Fidesz and hit hard. Simultaneously, the EU should find ways to correct deformed plurality by 
supporting liberal institutions such as independent media, non-governmental organizations, and 
universities. 
In this contribution, I analyze the EU’s options under the sanction provision of Article 7 TEU, and 
suggest a method and guidelines for devising the sanctions. After setting my research within the 
context of the Article 7 debate, I proceed to a textual analysis of the sanction provision followed by a 
contextual dimension focusing on the purpose of Article 7 as such. Thereafter, I examine the major 
political theories of sanctions that will help us understand how to achieve that objective. In the next 
step, I review institutional architecture for sanctioning and suggest improvements. The final two 
sections outline the principles that should govern the process of devising the sanction regime and 
identify different areas of rights that might be suspended. In the conclusion, I urge for sanctions 
tailored to the causes of deviation and political and societal structures in a target state. 
I. The EU’s Failure  
In December 2017, the Commission backed by France and Germany launched Article 7 procedure 
against Poland.
1
 At last. For several years, the politicians of a generation raised during the Cold War 
have been discarding Article 7 TEU as a nuclear option, that ought not to be used.
2
 The EU policy-
makers has repeatedly signaled that Article 7 does not provide them with a viable option to deal with 
the backsliding of some Member States from common European values. 
The nuclear analogy is misleading. The concept of mutually assured destruction counsels against 
deploying such weapons. It is also the reason why misconduct on a lower scale might be tolerated. 
However, it applies only to those in possession of the weapon or those under a protection of the 
weapon holder. Hungary and Poland do not have a counter-weapon that would assure the EU’s 
destruction at their disposal. The purpose of Article 7, within the nuclear paradigm, must then be to 
deter from wrongful conduct. If Article 7 were to create a deterrence effect, it ought to be used first.
3
 
The Commission has taken the first step. 
The hesitance of the EU to deal decisively with Viktor Orbán’s gradual illiberal reforms in 
Hungary after the 2010 parliamentary elections have relaxed, or even inspired, others with similar 
                                                     
1
 European Commission – Press release, Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in 
Poland, Dec. 20, 2017, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm.  
2
 J.M. Barroso, State of the Union Speech, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm, 2012. 
3
 The closing days of the WWII in the Pacific made it clear that only the use of atomic bomb would end Japan’s 
determination to continue fighting; the existence of the weapon was not enough. For the posterity, the deterrence effect 
has been established through the actual use of the nuclear option. The reader might forgive me for using this example 
(which surely exceeds the scale of the problem we deal with here), given that it was not me who has resorted to nuclear 
weapon analogy, so tirelessly repeated in the discourse on Article 7 time and again.  
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political agendas; such as Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) after winning the 2015 
presidential and parliamentary elections with a majority vote.  
Although critics point to the ineffectiveness of the Article 7 procedure resulting from its 
cumbersome voting requirements,
4
 the high majorities required by Article 7 in each step of the 
procedure are not manifestly disproportional to the seriousness of the issue Article 7 aims to address. 
In the current EU-28, nine Member States, the European Parliament (acting by two-thirds majority of 
the votes cast, representing the majority of MEPs)
5
 or the Commission may initiate the procedure. 
Twenty-two Member States may conclude that there is a risk of serious breach of common values by a 
Member State.
6
 Again, a reasonable majority
7
 are required to prevent abuse of the mechanism.
8
 
Thereafter, the European Council will decide unanimously, without counting the vote of the 
investigated Member State, on the existence of a serious and persistent breach of the common values. 
In the final stage, which is the object of this article, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may 
suspend Member State’s rights. 
The requirement of unanimity in the European Council is considered the major hurdle in the 
process. The European Council must enlist support from regimes that interpret the common values of 
the Union differently than those that are shared by the majority of its members. Allow me a few 
remarks on the margins. Firstly, we shall consider a possibility to initiate a joint Article 7 procedure 
against two or more states if the merits of the case are similar and offended values identical. This will 
disqualify the regimes that are worried to be the next in line from vetoing the European Council’s 
decision. Such an interpretation would require a thorough contextual analysis to overcome the obvious 
problem that the Article 7 refers to a procedure against “a Member State”.  
Secondly, the European Council’s vote takes place in the concluding stage of the procedure. 
Passing through the Rule of Law Framework procedure and the steps required by Article 7(1), means 
that the EU must gain support from a vast majority of stakeholders including at least twenty-two of the 
Member States and the majority of the MEPs. It would place considerable pressure on the states 
opposing the measures, and consequently force them to reveal the reasons for their objections. 
Thirdly, reaching the concluding stage of the Article 7 procedure may be beneficial even if the 
European Council’s decision is eventually vetoed. It may afford additional legitimacy to the liberal 
opposition both in the deviating state and in the vetoing state(s), stimulate public debate, and increase 
support of the general public for regime change. 
                                                     
4
 For an elaborate critique see e.g. U. Sedelmeier, Political safeguards against democratic backsliding in the EU: the limits 
of material sanctions and the scope of social pressure, Journal of European Public Policy 2017, p. 337-351. 
5
 Art. 354 TFEU. 
6
 The investigated Member State is not counted in the calculation of the required one-third and fourth-fifths majorities. See 
Art. 354 TFEU. 
7
 Whether the required majority shall be 19, 22 or 24 states is a political decision. A constitutional analysis may only 
assess the minimum that would be required to prevent an abuse of the mechanism and the maximum that would make the 
mechanism manifestly unattainable. 
8
 The requirement that the European Parliament acts by two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing the majority of 
MEPs is reasonable in light of majorities required for comparable instruments devised to neutralize or sanction 
constitution-threatening conduct such as presidential impeachment in several EU countries. 
 The investigated Member State is ensured basic rights of defense – by the requirement of the initiator of the procedure to 
submit a reasoned proposal and by the obligation of the Council to hear the investigated Member State (Art. 7(1) TEU). 
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The potential of Article 7 has been undermined since its inception. In 2000, the Member States 
mishandled the situation when the Freedom party (FPÖ) joined the Austrian government.
9
 They 
bypassed the new mechanism of Article 7 at the first possibility of its application.
10
 A decade 
thereafter, the EU, preoccupied with the Euro crisis and increased immigration, reacted sluggishly to 
the developments in Hungary and Poland.
11
 Finally, EU representatives raised the threshold for 
launching the Article 7 procedure when they declared it as a nuclear option.
12
 
One of the reasons why Article 7 has achieved the aura of Rubicon is the notion that its ultimate 
result would be the suspension of voting rights. Once I deconstruct the sanction provisions of Article 
7, it will become clear that the EU has an array of better options for remedying the conduct of a 
deviating Member State. 
Before turning to the textual analysis of Article 7, several preliminary observations must be 
considered. Firstly, human rights protection within the Union is relatively high in comparison with 
examples of states that have been sanctioned for human rights violation by the international 
community. Sanctions will affect these rights. Furthermore, the EU, by using the Article 7 procedure, 
will impose sanctions on its own citizens. A higher degree of scrutiny of direct and collateral damages 
that might be caused by sanctions to the general public is therefore necessary. 
Secondly, Article 7 is not a political provision that provides political sanctions, but creates a legal 
regime. The common values contained in Article 2 TEU form an equivalent to a constitutional core 
which signifies the constitutional identity of the European political community. The target state is 
guaranteed, albeit limited, judicial protection; the fulfilment of the procedural requirements is 
reviewable by the Court of Justice. The fact that the sanctions are not imposed by a judicial organ does 
not make Article 7 a political mechanism. This regime cannot be compared to other situations of pure 
political accountability, such as the failure to deliver on election promises. In the case of Article 7, the 
position of the European Council, the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament as 
agents are much clearer. If there is a “serious and persistent breach” by a Member State of the values 
enshrined in Article 2, the agents must act on behalf of EU citizens. The citizens have, at least, the 
right to be protected from a decision-making on the EU level, that could compromise Article 2 values 
(‘insulation’ rationale). Under an expansive reading of Article 7, the EU is obligated to its citizens to 
ensure that no public authority (on any level of governance) is manifestly arbitrary (‘political 
community’ rational). The use of the word “may” in each of the stages of Article 7, does not give a 
cart blanch to Member States and EU institutions to ignore a breach of the values contained in Article 
2. It provides them with flexibility as to the means for correcting the breach. 
Finally, choosing an effective sanction presupposes that we have in-depth knowledge about the 
causes of a Member State’s deviation from the common values. Illiberal trends, caused by unfinished 
democratic revolutions, failed market economy transformation or recent challenges – from the Euro 
                                                     
9
 M. Merlingen/C. Mudde/U. Sedelmeier, The Right and the Righteous? European Norms, Domestic Politics and the 
Sanctions Against Austria, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2001, p. 59-77; C. Leconte, The Fragility of the EU as a 
‘Community of Values’: Lessons from the Haider Affair, West European Politics, 2005, p. 620-49. 
10
  The provision now contained in Art. 7 TEU has been introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and were in force as of May 
1999, five months before the 1999 Austrian elections, in which FPÖ came second. The mechanism did not include the 
first phase, the warning mechanism, which was introduced by the Nice Treaty few years later. 
11
 See e.g. L. Pech/K.L. Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU, Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, 2017, p. 3-47. 
12
 Cf. also the introduction to the New EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, which justified the introduction of 
effectively another step in Article 7 procedure with a milder language: “current EU mechanisms and procedures have not 
always been [understand: never] appropriate in ensuring an effective and timely response to threats to the rule of law.” 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A new EU Framework to strengthen 
the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final, p. 2. 
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crisis and expansion of Russian and Chinese economic and political influence to immigration influx 
and terrorist attacks – have proliferated in the EU. Some member states have openly started to 
reconstruct their constitutional system on national-conservative grounds,
13
 others have silently 
adjusted their pre-liberal power structures to a new era,
14
 some have done so with occasional EU 
outcry,
15
 yet others have slid when attempting to co-opt the populist electorate
16
 or have deformed the 




A proper response under Article 7, in the form of tailored sanctions that are likely to bring a change 
in the objectionable behavior of a target state, requires a deep understanding of the causes of these 
trends and of the societal structure in that state. Especially, the senders of sanctions must determine 
which intrastate forces underpins the illiberal-prone regimes and reasons for failure of liberal forces to 
counteract these developments. 
II. Deconstructing the Sanction Provision of Article 7 
The third paragraph of Article 7 states that “the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to 
suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in 
                                                     
13
 The obvious examples are post-2010 Hungary and post-2015 Poland.  
K.L. Scheppele, Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution, Conscience of a Liberal Blog (Dec. 19, 2011), at 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/hungarys-constitutional-revolution; B. Bugarič, A crisis of constitutional 
democracy in post-Communist Europe: “Lands in-between” democracy and authoritarianism, ICON, 2015, p. 219-45; M. 
Bánkuti/G. Halmai/K.L. Scheppele, Disabling the Constitution, J. Democracy, 2012, p. 138-146. 
14
 See recent efforts to uncover the depth of the problem in Slovenia. Bugarič 2015, fn. 12 (comparing Slovenia and 
Hungary); M. Avbelj, Failed Democracy: The Slovenian Patria Case – (Non) Law in Context, SSRN at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2462613, translation from Slovenian original M. Avbelj, Zadeva 
Patria – (ne)pravo v kontekstu, Pravna praksa, 2014; P. Guasti/B. Dobovšek/B. Ažman, Deficiencies in the Rule of Law in 
Slovenia in the Context of Central and Eastern Europe, J. Crim. Justice & Security, 2013, p. 175-190. 
15
 See the establishment of Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, an unprecedented rule of law monitoring mechanism, 
to assess rule of law deficiencies in Romania and Bulgaria that has become effective upon their accession to the EU. D. 
Kochenov/L. Pech, Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality, European 
Constitutional Law Review, 2015, p. 512-40; M. A. Vachudova/A. Spendzharova, The EU’s Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism: Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession, SIEPS European Policy Analysis, 2012. 
Cf. also contributions in A. von Bogdandy/P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: 
Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania, 2015. 
16
 Most notable example is the Haider case in Austria in 1999/2000, but cf. also policy shifts in French mainstream parties 
in reaction to an electorate increase of Le Pen’s National Front, France’s response to 2005 ethnic riots, its 2012 policies 
concerning Roma minority, or borders’ restrictions with Italy in response to immigration influx. For Austria, see 
contributions in R. Wodak/A. Pelinka (eds.), The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, 2009. For France see e.g. B.J. 
Kelley/C.J. Edwards, France's Roma Row: An Examination of the French Government's Violation of EU and 
International Law, Willamette J. Int'l L. & Dis. Res., 2017, p. 169-210; M. des Neiges Léonard, The Effects of Political 
Rhetoric on the Rise of Legitimized Racism in France: The Case of the 2005 French Riots, Critical Sociology, 2016, p. 
1087-1107. 
17
 E.g. Italy in Berlusconi’s era and constraints on media plurality. Cf. P. Ginsborg, Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power 
and Patrimony, 2005. Also, the Czech Republic’s experience has shown several instances in which Article 2 TEU values 
were compromised over the last five years or so. If put together, these incidences reveal cracks in a liberal democracy 
wall: midnight amnesty of President Klaus preventing prosecution of large-scale economic crimes of 1990s; his unilateral 
stalling of ratification of Lisbon Treaty and refusal to ratify the Article 136 TFEU Amendment resulting alongside the 
amnesty controversy into a high treason indictment against him; President Zeman’s selective refusal to appoint university 
professors; his tampering with constitutional process of government formation in 2013, bypassing the Parliament; a 
dubious economic and political influence of China and Russia in the Czech Republic; the landslide victory of populist 
ANO party in 2017 parliamentary elections, likely to form a minority government supported by an odd coalition of the 
Communists and the far-right SPD. 
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question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in 
the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a 
suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons. The obligations of the Member 
State in question under this Treaty shall in any case continue to be binding on that State.” 
Only certain rights can be suspended. If all the rights of a deviating Member State are suspended, 
the result would equal to expulsion of the state from the EU. This scenario is not legally possible. 
Rights can only be suspended. Therefore, the suspended rights must be restorable. The sanctions 
placed on a deviating state cannot deprive the state from exercising these rights after the sanctions are 
lifted. 
Only rights “deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State” in question can be 
suspended, that is only the rights that EU membership has created are subject to the provision of 
Article 7. From the general definition of “application of the Treaties” (in connection to structural 
features of EU law, such as direct effect and supremacy) it can be assumed that Article 7 also includes 
the rights afforded by secondary EU law. 
The requirement that “the possible consequences of such suspension on the rights and obligations 
of natural and legal persons” must be taken into account, limits the range and depth of sanctions. The 
words “take into account” direct the attention to proportionality, but only in respect to “rights and 
obligations of natural and legal persons.” From all the possible sanctions that satisfy the desired goal, 
those sanctions that have the least negative consequences for the rights and obligations of natural and 
legal persons will be preferred. Besides this special requirement of proportionality, the general 
principle of proportionality will apply (see part V). 
Article 7 states that the obligations in the Treaty remain binding. A reciprocity recourse is not 
possible. For instance, withdrawing disbursement of EU funds to deviating state does not mean that 
the sanctioned state can stop paying its share into the EU budget. 
Voting rights suspension is only one of the possible sanctions. The range of sanctions available are 
limited by the requirement that the object of sanctions must be suspendible rights derived from the 
application of the Treaty. 
Whose rights may be suspended? The provision of Article 7 para. 3 TEU does not refer to 
“Member State’s rights”, but to rights deriving from the Treaty. Who the beneficiary of the rights is 
does not matter. It could be either a Member State or individuals. Article 7 therefore allows for the 
suspension of individual rights. A corrective, I will introduce it in the next section, is that the 
suspension of rights must be able to alter the objectionable policy of target state. This imposes limits 
on the choice of rights that can be suspended. 
A suspension of rights derived from the application of EU Treaties (that is afforded by the 
existence of the Treaties) is only possible on the basis of the Treaties, and the secondary law 
authorized by the Treaties. Of course, Article 7 TEU is only one of many instances where the Treaties 
permit sanctions or suspension of certain rights.
18
 The point being that the Article 7 TEU procedure 
cannot be substituted by coordinated bilateral or multilateral actions that are not authorized by the 
Treaties and have the effect of suspending rights derived from the Treaties. In such cases, the 
sanctioned state could bring an infringement action against the senders of sanctions.
19
 
                                                     
18
 Most importantly Art. 260 TFEU. Cf. also sanctions within the EMU – Art. 126/11 TFEU concerning excessive 
government deficit authorizes sanctions ranging from “inviting” the EIB to reconsider its lending policy to imposing 
fines; the Excessive Imbalance Procedure may lead to gradual sanctions, ranging from an interest-bearing deposit to 
annual fines; etc. 
19
 Several commentators urged Austria to turn to the CJEU against concerted sanctions imposed by fourteen Member 
States, either dissimulating that their decision was in fact a decision of the Council or pleading breach of loyalty clause 
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III. Purpose of Article 7 
1. A Sanction Regime 
Article 7 does not speak of ‘sanctions.’ The term in international relations theory, as well as in 
international law scholarship, has never been meant to signify a punishment. It refers to a policy of the 
sender state to alter, through a negative incentive, the behavior of the target state.
20
 The general 
understanding of the scholarship on Article 7 and rule of law seems to be the same. The aim of the 
mechanism is to alter the behavior of a deviating Member State. In this context, the use of the term 
‘sanction’ in connection to Article 7 is warranted. The term ‘suspension of rights’ simply suggests a 
limitation as to what kind of sanctions can be imposed. 
2. Limited Reading of Article 7: Insulation of Deviating State from EU Decision-Making 
The comprehension of Article 7, including its legislative history and Copenhagen criteria origins,
21
 is 
not straightforward. The only example of possible sanctions mentioned by para. 3 of Article 7 is a 
suspension of voting rights. We may reasonably construe a limited understanding of Article 7 as a 
mechanism to insulate the EU from the impact of a Member State that deviates from the common 
values.
22
 The objective is that the EU functioning, mainly its decision-making, is not compromised by 
the participation of the deviating state, given that the Member State governments are EU co-legislators 
and sometime sole legislators. Such comprehension of Article 7 would have a profound impact on the 
range of possible sanctions. The principle of proportionality would require only such sanctions that are 
necessary to insulate EU decision-making from the influence of a deviating state that attempts to 
expand its different values on the EU as a whole. The relative decision-making power of such state 
would have to be taken into account alongside, perhaps, its policy preferences at the EU level and 
coalition potential. 
3. Expansive reading of Article 7: Protection of EU Citizens 
Three structural arguments can be made in favor of an expansive reading of Article 7. Firstly, the EU 
relies, in a vast majority of cases, on Member State institutions for implementation, application, and 
enforcement of EU law. In order for these institutions to fulfil their European mandates, they must act 
in accordance with the values contained in Article 2 TEU. State institutions apply and enforce EU law 
in situations that often involve other Member States’ natural and legal persons. Both in Hungary and 
Poland, the objectionable policy has included an attack on the independency of courts. In Hungary, 
several instances were recorded of pressure on the judiciary to alter its decisions involving 
interpretation and application of EU law. 
Secondly, the original aim of the Article 7 mechanism must have been to eventually resolve the 
deadlock. The suspension of rights is not intended to insulate the EU indefinitely from a deviating 
(Contd.)                                                                  
by the fourteen Member States towards Austria. The Austrian government decided to wait for an early end of the 
sanctions rather than to escalate the issue through a legal battle. See G. Winkler, Europa quo vadis. Die Anatomie eines 
europäischen Willküraktes, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 2000, p. 231-68, 259; E. Regan, Are EU Sanctions Against 
Austria Legal?, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 2000, p. 323-36, 331. 
20
 G.C. Hufbauer/J.J. Schott/K.A. Elliot/B. Oegg, Economic Sanctions reconsidered, 3rd ed., 2007, 65 ff.  
21
 W. Sadurski, Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of Article 7, E.U. Enlargement, and Jorg Haider, Colum. J. Eur. L., 2010, 
p. 385-426. 
22
 Cf. J.-W. Müller, Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States?, European Law Journal 
2015, p. 141-160, 144. 
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Member State, but to pressure the state to alter its objectionable policy. The term ‘suspension of 
rights’ itself suggests temporality. 
Thirdly and most importantly, the EU has a constitutional quality. Not because the Court of Justice 
said so, but because it has been practiced as such by the vast majority of officials for a considerable 
time. Scholars differ in assessing the depth of such constitutional quality, but nevertheless, the 
majority would agree that the values of Article 2 TEU create normative expectations for EU citizens, 
including those with Hungarian or Polish citizenship. Hence, Article 7 protects, to a certain degree 
depending on our understanding of how deep the EU constitutional quality goes, these citizens against 
a Member State’s parliamentary majority that encroaches on the values of Article 2 TEU. 
IV. Political Theory of Sanctions and Article 7 
1. Mechanisms Through Which Sanctions Operate 
The expansive reading of Article 7 suggest that the sanctions are meant to achieve the same aim as 
international sanctions; that is to eventually change the objectionable behavior of target state. 
Crawford and Klotz divide the tools through which sanctions aim to influence the target state’s actions 
into four categories: normative communication, compellance, resource denial, and political fracture.
23
 
By imposing sanctions, the sender states morally disapprove the target state’s policy and hope that the 
domestic pressure would force the state authorities to change the objectionable policy (normative 
communication).
24
 The logic behind the compellance is that by imposing costs on the state’s 
objectionable policy, the cost-benefit analysis would prompt the rational state elite to change their 
policy. The resource denial mechanism operates by targeting resources that are needed to sustain a 
state’s objectionable behavior. Finally, political fracture is the most intrusive mechanism. Here, the 
objective of the sanctions is to function as a catalyst of a legitimacy crisis. The crisis should stimulate 
political opposition, create ruptures in the regime base and eventually bring a switch of a part of 
regime supporters to an opposition, resulting in a change of regime. 
2. From State as a Black Box to in-depth Analysis of its Political, Economic, and Social Structures 
The move to targeted (or smart) sanctions in the 1990s was not originally driven by the desire to 
increase the effectiveness of sanctions, but to minimize their impact on the population of target state.
25
 
The United Nations shifted their focus towards individuals and entities whose actions threatened 
international peace and security, and towards the economic sectors that made these actions possible. 
Early data indicated that targeted sanctions were, in fact, less effective than comprehensive sanctions. 
The demand for more creative sanctioning mechanisms that would work against non-state 
transnationally-operating actors prompted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States has 
brought new impetus to sanctions research. Traditionally IR theories failed in explaining how 
sanctions (do not) work, and offered limited counsel to the decision-makers that devised targeted 
sanctions. Their focus on aggregated state interests (simplified in fact into leaders’ preferences) has 
been inadequate for projecting sanctions’ impact in the internal affairs of target states. 
                                                     
23
 N.C. Crawford/A. Klotz, How Sanctions Work: A Framework for Analysis, in: N.C. Crawford/A. Klotz (ed.), How 
Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, 1999, p. 25 ff. 
24
 Cf. F. Giumelli, The Success of Sanctions: Lesson Learned from the EU Experience, 2014, p. 12 and 135 ff. 
25
 The international public outcry over humanitarian consequences of comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq following 
its invasion to Kuwait in 1990 made the United Nations to rethink its approach. Since 1994 no new sanctions imposed by 
the UN have included comprehensive economic sanctions. See A. Pellet/A. Miron, Sanctions, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2012, Vol. IX, 1, 6-7, para 29 ff. 
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The liberal theory’s most promising contribution to sanction research is coalitional liberalism, 
according to which a state’s international behavior is a result of interactions among domestic interest 
groups.
26
 It relies predominantly on the compellance rationale following the assumption of the liberal 
theory that rational utility-maximizing actors would change (or would be forced to change by a 
domestic alliance that underpins the regime) an objectionable state’s policy if the costs of keeping the 
policy imposed by the sanctions outweigh its benefits.
27
 
A rational utility-maximizing actor is also at the center of public choice theory of sanctions. 
According to the public choice theory, the public interest is a result of the aggregated individual 
interests and must therefore be Pareto improving. It is unlikely that a new policy will be favorable to 
all, therefore concessions to opposing individuals are made.
28
 For sanctions research, it implies that the 
objectionable policy has a definable structure of support set in the marketplace. The theory shifts the 
focus from the government elite to various kinds of domestic groups (whose preferences are, again, 
defined as aggregated individual preferences) and their capacity to influence government policy. 
Major intrastate actors are defined as rent-seeking groupings of individuals (various producers’ and 
consumers’ groups, state employees, etc.).29 These social groups compete to influence state policies. 
“Because they derive differential utility from any given policy, they have different ‘demand 
curves’.”30 When an equilibrium is reached, a policy is supplied. Sanctions must be designed in such a 
way that their effect shift the demand curves of the competing social groups and set a new equilibrium 
in which the objectionable policy is replaced by a new one.
31
  
One of the major flaws of the public choice theory of sanctions is its perception of state as neutral 
broker between interest groups. In fact, these groups do not have an equal access to state. Also, the 
public choice theorists underestimate ideological drivers of policy formation since their intellectual 
framework treats ideology simply as goods exchangeable in the marketplace. 
Although policies depending on shifting demand curves shall be inherently unstable, empirical 
research has shown that institutions were able to produce stable policies. Shepsle calls it a ‘structure-
induced equilibrium’: what public choice theorists consider free competition of social groups is in fact 
largely defined by an overall structure of decision-making process.
32
 Consequently, attention must be 
drawn to how actors design “institutions to secure mutual gains, and how those institutions change or 
persist over time.”33 For sanctions theory, it means to define structure-induced equilibria in different 
institutional settings and arrive at reasonable amount of regime types. The regime types differ 
according to how broad coalition they need for sustaining themselves. For instance, democracies shall 
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be more vulnerable to sanctions than autocracies because they involve broader coalitions.
34
 According 
to the institutionalists, leaders pursue minimum-winning coalitions, and a country’s politics will define 
how broad such coalition must be. Autocracies’ lack of representative institutions narrows down the 
minimum-winning coalition because most people are prevented from influencing the government’s 
decisions. Therefore, autocratic regimes can withstand sanctions by diverting scarce resources from 
the general public to their narrow supporting coalition.
35
  
Institutionalist's’ attempts to refine their crude democracy-autocracy dichotomy into a more nuance 
categorization have largely failed on empirical grounds.
36
 For example, emerging illiberal democracies 
within the EU can sustain considerable outside pressure due to broad popular support, while some 
traditional democracies rely on increasingly narrower political coalitions because a considerable part 
of the political space is ‘blocked’ by protest parties. An evaluation of institutional structure cannot 
predict how sanctions will affect a regime without taking into account societal, religious, and 
economic structures, resources availability, foreign partnerships, etc. 
The insights of coalitional liberalism, public choice theory of sanctions, and regime-oriented 
institutionalism has been synthesized by Blanchard and Ripsman
37
 in an approach reviving Max 
Weber’s assumptions on state-society relationships.38 For neo-Weberians, the state is not a neutral 
broker that mediates between the interests of different social groups. There is a substantial capacity of 
states to “implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social 
groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances.”39 Applied to sanctions design, 
senders of sanctions must analyze domestic political institutions and structures of the target state to 
realize which groups have access to state and which groups’ interests the state can ignore.40 Three 
institutional attributes determine the robustness of state autonomy or ‘stateness’: decision-making 
autonomy (“structural ability of the foreign policy executive to select and implement policies” despite 
domestic opposition), state capacity (“policy resources available […] to co-opt or coerce key societal 
groups”), and legitimacy (degree to which domestic groups defer to the leader’s right to rule, i.e. 
his/her authority).
41
 The higher the stateness, the more the state is able to diffuse, divert, or overcome 
the impact of sanctions.  
Neo-Weberians have been criticized for approaching the state autonomy in isolation from state-
society dynamics. What they understand as capacity or resources of the state per se are in fact the 
results of a lengthy power struggle among various social forces within the state. For the state is a 
“complex and constituted set of relationships between frameworks of political authority and the 
international political economy, domestic social forces, and the broader ideational notions of 
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authority...”.42 The social power relations are dynamic, allowing for new patterns to emerge. This 
approach builds on Gramscian state theory.
43
 “[S]tate power is fundamentally a social relation. That is, 
rather than existing as a ‘thing’ independent of society, state institutions and capacities are 
condensations of historically specific, dynamically evolving relationships between social forces.”44 
The ruling elites must forge relatively broad coalitions of socio-political forces to capture state power. 
Subsequently, dominant coalitions reconfigure state institutions and the allocation of resources to 
maintain the power. Each coalition is composed of a number of groups, which may form new 
coalitions or shift their allegiance to opposition coalitions if their interests are harmed by sanctions.  
Jones illustrates how sanctions work within the Gramscian framework in an example of South 
Africa during the apartheid regime. Sanctions at first helped the ruling elite to hold their power. The 
reason was that arms and oil embargoes pushed the state-controlled economy to develop new 
industrial capacities, through which the ruling coalition could co-opt rising social forces. Only the 
economic downturn in the 1980s forced the state to let the business outgrow state patronage, who, as 
sanctions bit, realized that it was in their best interest to end the racial-social conflict.
45
 
The overview of major sanctions theories developed from international relations, economic, and 
political science theories indicates the specificity of sanction research. Devising successful sanctions 
requires a complex understanding of the material, institutional, and ideational bases of power. Bare 
knowledge about intrastate decision-making processes is insufficient. The challenge is to locate the 
weakest link in a coalition supporting the state’s objectionable policy, with the potential to change the 
balance of power, and devise incentives that would direct the behavior of the selected group in a 
desired way. Jones proposes to proceed in three steps: first, to identify socio-political coalitions 
contesting state power and the political economy context that structures them; second, to assess the 
economic impacts of sanctions and their distribution across societal groups; and third, to examine the 
strategic response of key societal forces and their political consequences.
46
 
V. Sanctioning Principles 
The EU institutional framework aims at promoting human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights (values).
47
 According to the Treaty, these values are best 
attained in a “society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail” (structural conditions).48 When these values are seriously and 
persistently breached over a period of several domestic elections, it indicates that the safeguards built 
into a liberal-democratic system failed, and that the structural conditions have been deformed. 
Sanctions imposed under Article 7 must therefore aim at reforming the structural conditions that 
allows the society to realize the full potential of the values.  
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1. Democracy-inbound 
The weakening of the fundamental structures of a liberal-democratic state, such as independent and 
values-oriented constitutional review of executive and legislative actions, objective reporting by media 
independent of the government, and critical scientific research, impedes the voters’ ability to form an 
informed opinion within the boundaries of a liberal-philosophy framework. The examples of Hungary 
and Poland reveal a pattern for dismantling a pluralist system. After a landslide victory in general 
elections, the winning party elite controls both the executive and the legislative bodies. The 
constitutional court becomes the first target; then comes a subjugation of news media; and finally, a 
containment of NGOs and universities, control of foreign capital flow into political activities and the 
establishment of political patronage over major domestic economic actors. This process disrupts 
‘democratic equality’ understood as an equal opportunity of political actors for influencing the 
electorate. The first sanctioning principle, which I call ‘democracy-inbound’, requires the sanctions to 
aim at restoring democratic equality. The focal point, when devising sanctions, must be on democracy, 
not on the rule of law. The rule-of-law approach to the problem, for instance in Poland, blinds us to 
see the roots of the deviation.
 49





The principle of the effectiveness of law is one of the cornerstones of the CJEU’s jurisprudence.51 The 
Treaty further emphasizes the efficient functioning of EU institutions and the effectiveness of their 
policies and actions.
52
 An effective sanction design must fulfil two goals: first, the EU must opt for 
such sanctions that are able, through a chain of actions, to alter the objectionable policy of target state. 
To achieve that, the EU must employ a state of the art sanction theory and apply it on the target state’s 
power structures. Second, the principle of effectiveness requires a thorough examination of all the 
options available to the target state that may neutralize the sanctions’ impact. Sanctioned states have 
proved to be creative in busting its sanctions. Third states and individuals line up, immediately after 
the introduction of sanctions, to benefit from a premium the sanctioned state must pay (either in 
economic or political terms) to bypass the sanctions.
53
 For instance, cutting EU funds to Hungary may 
create opportunities for Russia to increase its financial and political presence. Russia has been 
gradually filling the void created by the rupture between Hungary and the EU, using the far-right 
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Jobbik party, or an expansion of Paks nuclear plant,
54
 eventually overcoming Orbán’s initial reluctance 




The sanction provision of Article 7 is subject to the general and special obligations of proportionality. 
The general three-part proportionality test guides the intellectual process of devising sanctions: the 
measure is suitable to change the objectionable policy of the target state; the objectionable policy 
cannot be changed by a less intrusive measure (the measure is necessary); and even if there is no less 
intrusive mean of achieving the aim, the measure does not have an excessive effect on the target 
state’s rights.56 
Senders of sanctions also have a special obligation of proportionality. Article 7 requires the 
Council to “take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and 
obligations of natural and legal persons.” The special obligation qualifies the third part of general 
proportionality test. Also, since the provision does not oblige the Council to do everything possible to 
avoid negative consequences for natural and legal persons, but only to take them into account, the 
construction of the provision suggests that the senders of sanctions may, on the one hand, target 
individuals (natural and legal persons)
57
 and, on the other hand must limit possible collateral damage 
that the sanctions will inevitably cause to persons that are not the direct object of sanctions.  
4. Beneficiary-focus 
From the extensive reading of Article 7, which I mentioned in part III, it follows that the purpose of 
Article 7 is to ensure that exercise of public power within the territory of the EU respects the 
fundamental values listed in Article 2 TEU. Many decisions of national authorities have effect in other 
EU Member States without further conditions, from judicial decisions in civil and criminal matters, 
including issuance of a European Arrest Warrant, to administrative decisions, certifications of quality 
and qualification, etc. Natural and legal persons residing in the EU, who are not citizens or entities 
incorporated in the deviating state, might be subject to the decisions of public authorities of such state 
on a regular basis and too an extent incomparable with other regions. The application of both EU law 
and national law, their effects, and their subjects are intertwined. It is near to impossible to quarantine 
a deviating Member State and leave it to ‘its’ citizens to deal with the problem. 
The ultimate beneficiaries of Article 7 are therefore natural and legal persons, in particular EU 
citizens and EU incorporated firms, regardless of their Member State citizenship or residence. They 
legitimately expect that fundamental standards in the exercise of public power anywhere in the EU are 
adhered to. The beneficiary-focus principle requires, first, to realize who is the beneficiary of the 
sanction provision of Article 7, and, second, to devise sanctions in the way in which they are capable 
to better the position of beneficiary. It is misleading to ask whether Article 7 should protect democracy 
inside a Member State and whether it shall protect, for instance, Polish citizens against its government. 
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As long as a Member State does not leave the EU by way of Article 50 TEU procedure, it is a federal 
matter (due to structural reasons mentioned above) to ensure that the exercise of public authority 
anywhere in the Union, and on any level of government (subject to subsidiarity)
58
 is in compliance 
with the basic standards that follow from the values listed in Article 2 TEU. 
VI. EU Institutional Architecture for Sanctioning 
Since the introduction of CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has accumulated 
considerable experience with sanctioning third states, non-state groups, and individuals. Currently, the 
EU consolidated sanction list contains some forty states and a number of terrorist organizations and 
individuals using various tools from arms embargoes, embargoes on nuclear and oil-extracting 
technologies, trade restrictions, freezing of funds and economic resources, travel bans, to embargoes 
on goods that can be used for human trafficking or illegal exports.
59
 A dedicated body of the 
Commission, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), is responsible for preparing a proposal 
for regulation imposing sanctions for the Council, discussing the proposal with Member States’ 
experts,
60
 and facilitating sanctions’ implementation within the EU, including issues of interpretation 
raised by economic operators, and reviewing of listings on the sanction lists.
61
  
The FPI’s know-how in sanctioning must be combined with the expertise of the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and to some extent, its predecessors, the European Monitoring 
Centre for Racism and Xenophobia and the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental 
Rights.
62
 In any stage of the Article 7 process, the Agency is empowered to provide the EU institutions 
and the Member States with assistance and expertise. The question of the FRA’s competence in 
regards to Article 7 has been contentious.
63
 The Agency’s jurisdiction is limited to assistance and 
expertise relating to fundamental rights when EU institutions or Member States implement the EU law 
“in order to support them when they take measures or formulate courses of action […] to fully respect 
fundamental rights.”64 Article 7 gives the EU the competence to initiate an Article 7 procedure by a 
reasoned opinion, to determine that there is a risk of serious breach of Article 2 TEU values, to 
determine that there has been breach of the values, and consequently sanction a Member State that 
breaches these values. These steps are an implementation of EU law involving fundamental rights (the 
ones that are at risk of breach or being breached, and the fundamental rights that might be affected by 
sanctions). The Agency is therefore empowered to assist the EU institutions with collecting and 
analyzing data on fundamental rights protection in the Member State in question and supply evidence 
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on fundamental rights violations that might indicate a clear risk of a serious breach of fundamental 
rights and, subsequently, a serious and persistent breach of fundamental rights corresponding to 
Article 2 TEU values (access to justice, gender and minority discrimination, right to vote, human 
dignity, etc.).
65
 In the sanctioning phase of Article 7 procedure, the Agency can assist the Council with 
conducting research on structural problems that have made the breach of fundamental rights possible 
and indicate possible ways to correct the situation, as well as pointing out consequences of sanctions 
for the fundamental rights of natural and legal persons.
66
 
The EU may also build on its experience with evaluating state compliance with Article 2 TEU 
values during the accession process with Central and Eastern European states,
 67
 and in particular the 
experience with the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification for Bulgaria and Romania (CVM) 
that provides for post-accession reviews of progress of intrastate reforms of judicial and law 
enforcement institutions and processes.
68
 The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the 
introduction of regular assessments of all Member States’ compliance with EU fundamental values.69 
The introduction of the EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law has brought some flexibility into 
the Article 7 process (although it is not its formal part).
70
 In the case of Hungary and Poland, the 
introduction of the Framework might have been self-defeating since it has signaled certain quandary 
on the side of EU institutions concerning the use of Article 7, regardless the fact that the latter 
procedure was eventually initiated.
71
 It may prove useful for the future. By putting the Commission in 
charge, the Framework may help it with gathering evidence in cooperation with the FRA, the 
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European Parliament, and the Venice Commission,
72
 identifying the causes of systemic problems in 
deviating state(s), and increasing European public awareness
73
 that could place pressure on Member 
States reluctant to support the Article 7 process. The Commission, as one of the initiators of Article 7, 
may serve as a prosecutor that submits a well-build case against a Member State to the Council.  
EU institutional architecture for sanctioning must improve its review process for the purposes of 
Article 7 sanctions. In the area of external sanctioning, targeted individuals and entities are notified by 
letter or by means of a notice in the EU Official Journal. They may submit a request, supported by 
evidence, to the Council to reconsider their listing, and eventually file an annulment action against the 
listing decision before the General Court. The Court of Justice repeatedly criticized EU institutions for 
their failure to develop sufficient due process standards in the instances where individuals are targeted. 
In the 2014 decision in Yusef v Commission, the General Court held that the Commission failed to 
follow the procedures set down in the Kadi cases.
74
 In particular, the Commission bound itself to the 
findings of the U.N. Sanctions Committee, instead of reviewing the findings independently.
75
 Albeit in 
sanctioning under Article 7, the issue of UN-EU jurisdiction overlap is obsolete, the anti-terrorism 
sanctions listing cases set the standard for targeted sanctions against individuals as far as the scope of 
evidence, its publicity, burden of proof, and right of rebuttal are concerned. 
VII. What Rights Can Be Suspended? 
Sanctions can take myriads of forms. The Union may, for instance, blacklist individuals and entities 
that form economic bases of deviating regimes and ban them from participating in EU co-funded 
projects, submit exports of selected entities to common tariff for third countries, ban candidates of 
government parties from participating in elections to the European Parliament, refuse individuals 
nominated by the deviating states to EU posts, require visas for selected individuals to enter other 
Member States, cease to recognize judicial decisions in civil matters originating in these countries, etc.  
The challenge is to find such sanction mix that would be able to correct a deformation of political 
pluralism (the structural conditions) in a deviating Member State that allows the regime to stay in 
power and dismantle independent control of its power step by step. Such positive sanctions ideally 
include options to increase the influence of independent media, the freedom of scientific research, and 
the voice of liberal opposition. 
In the last part of my contribution, I can only sketch major areas of possible sanctions. ‘Rights 
deriving from the application of the Treaties’ include rights afforded by both primary law and 
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secondary law. After this initial research on the Council’s options in selecting the appropriate 
sanctions, experts in different areas of EU law will have to step in and analyze concrete examples, 
their impact on rights of others, and their international law limits. 
1. Targeting Individuals 
The decision of the European Council on the existence of a breach of EU values is directed against a 
concrete Member State. Consequently, targeted individuals and entities must have legal or substantive 
relations to that Member State (citizenship, long-term residency, incorporation in the deviating 
Member State, conducting majority of their business in the Member State). EU citizenship is not a 
condition as long as targeted individuals and entities benefit from the rights derived from the 
application of the Treaties. The principle of proportionality further requires that it must be established 
that a targeted individual’s or entity’s conduct contributes to the state authorities’ breach of the Article 
2 TEU values. The test should not be burdensome, because the principle of proportionality must be 
balanced against the principle of effectiveness.
76
 
2. Political Rights 
Suspension of political rights involves, first of all, the suspension of participation in the functioning of 
EU institutions, especially the right to vote. This is primarily based on the insulation rationale. 
Representatives of a regime that does not respect the same set of fundamental values as the rest of the 
EU should not co-create laws and policies for EU citizens. From this point of view, a suspension of 
voting rights in the Council would be insufficient. A deviating Member State participates in EU 
decision-making through the European Council and its representatives in the European Parliament. 
Moreover, despite a requirement of independence, the Member State is likely to use its nomination 
and appointment powers to insert its like-minded candidates into the European Commission, the 
CJEU, and other EU institutions and its agencies. 
Insulating rationale that supports a suspension of voting rights in the Council as a preferable 
sanction is further undermined by the fact that a single Member State, however big, does not have 
enough power to meaningfully effect EU decision-making, given that the areas requiring unanimity 
have been significantly narrowed down and the coalition potential of a deviating state is low.
77
 In the 
European Parliament, on the other hand, a Member State’s influence might be amplified. Despite 
Fidesz having only eleven seats in the 8th Parliament (fourteen seats in the previous Parliament), its 
good standing within the European Peoples Party (EPP)
78
 has been an important factor in moderating 
the EU’s response to Hungary’s assault on liberal statehood.79 The EPP’s public record includes voting 
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 Moreover, Article 7 explicitly allows a sanction that limit rights of persons irrespective of their contribution to the breach 
of EU values: a suspension of voting rights affects the right to vote of all citizens of a deviating state. 
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against the 2013 Tavares report,
80
 and the EPP president Daul’s endorsement of Orbán during the 
2014 Hungarian parliamentary election campaign. Fidesz’s position might have weakened since.81 
Yet, the balance of power between the EPP and the Social Democrats, which has narrowed down to 
thirty votes in the 8th Parliament, is favorable to outcasts within the major blocks.
82
 The PiS has been 
less successful. Its parliamentary group, the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe 
(ACRE), is on the fringes of EP decision-making. Still, being in control together with British 
Conservatives of ACRE parliamentary group amplifies PiS’s influence.83 
A further problem is that a suspension of voting rights will not apply to Treaty revisions.
84
  
For any meaningful attempt at insulating the EU from the influence of a deviating state, sanctions 
will have to target the EU institutions in a complex way. Besides suspending voting rights, as well as 
the right to participate in the functioning of the Council, the Council may suspend the right of a 
Member State to participate in the meetings of the European Council, suspend the right to stand in the 
European elections, suspend the right to suggest a candidate for a member of the Commission
85
 and 
suspend the right to participate in appointing members of the Court of Justice (Judges and Advocates 
General), General Court, and specialized courts.
86
  
A suspension of political rights is not limited to the right to stand for office, but also includes 
citizens’ rights to vote in the European elections and the right of resident non-nationals to vote and 
stand as candidates in municipal elections (although a purpose of suspending the latter right is 
dubious). 
Use of these sanctions may be prevented by the principle of separation of powers. Critics may 
argue that the Council cannot impose sanctions that encroach on the functioning of other EU 
institutions. This argument is strengthened by lower procedural requirements for imposing sanctions 
once the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of Article 2 TEU values has 
been determined. In the sanction stage of the Article 7 mechanism, the Council acts alone (neither the 
European Council, nor the Parliament, nor the Commission are involved) and the qualified majority 
suffices for suspension of rights.  
Such an argument is not warranted. The European Parliament must consent to both determining the 
risk of breach of Article 2 values, and subsequently the existence of the breach. The Commission 
should assume a role of prosecutor initiating both of these procedures and be responsible for the 
submission of a well-build case against a Member State. Its proposal initiating the procedure leading 
to the determination of existence of breach of the values must include an in-depth analysis of the 
causes of the breach and identification of persons and institutions responsible for the breach. Since, 
under such an approach, the European Council will assume a role of an independent evaluator of the 
evidence submitted by the Commission and the defense of the investigated Member State, the 
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 European Parliament, Report on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary, 25 June 2013 
(the Tavares Report). 
81
 In a recent resolution of the European Parliament calling upon the Civil Liberties Committee to draw up a report on the 
situation in Poland, the votes from EPP members secured the majority (European Parliament resolution of 17 May 2017 
on the situation in Hungary). One of the reasons for declining support within the EPP for Viktor Orbán was Fidesz’s 
opposition to Jean-Claude Juncker, the official candidate of the EPP, for the Presidency of the Commission.  
82
 Consider the scenario that Forza Italia and Fidesz are removed from the EPP caucus. Consequently, the EPP would lose 
the majority to Social Democrats. 
83
 ACRE has 50 seats. 
84
 Cf. Art. 48(4) TEU. 
85
 Art. 17(7) TEU. Cf. also Art. 17(3) TEU (requiring that members of the Commission shall be chosen on the grounds of 
their “European commitment”). 
86
 Art. 253 and 254 TFEU.  
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Commission will be also responsible, due to its institutional capacities (namely the FPI) and available 
assistance from the FRA, for devising sanctions. In such a case, the consent of the European 
Parliament required in key stages of the procedure will include proposed sanctions as well.
87
 When 
deciding on sanction mix, the Council will be bound by the decision of the European Council 
regarding the determination of the existence of value breach, in which the European Council will 
specify whether and how it differs from the Commission’s proposal. The Council will then simply 
implement the decision of the European Council by opting for such sanction mix for such period as 
will be appropriate regarding the evidence the European Council considers proven after examining the 
Commission’s proposal and hearing the investigated Member State. 
Furthermore, the Court of Justice will most likely have its say in the procedure. Firstly, Article 269 
TFEU empowers the Court to examine, upon a petition of the Member State, against which the 
procedure is held, whether the ‘procedural stipulations’ of Article 7 were respected in the decisions of 
the European Council and the Council. The meaning and extent of ‘procedural stipulations’ must be 
examined by the Court itself. And secondly, targeted individuals may bring the decisions adopted 
within the Article 7 procedure to the Court under the annulment procedure. The Member State in 




The Council, subject to the principles outlined in Part V of this contribution, seems to be 
authorized by Article 7 to suspend a right to participate in EU institutions for nationals of a target 
Member State en bloc. Such a general ban would prevent nationals of a deviating state to be involved 
in the functioning of the European Central Bank, European System of Central Banks, the Court of 
Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and EU agencies. The 
ban may also include bureaucracies of the Commission and other institutions’ apparatus. The general 
ban to participate in EU institutions does not fall within political rights suspension anymore. It is 
rather a suspension of the right not to be discriminated based on nationality. Its rationale, if combined 
with comprehensive suspension of economic rights, is to cause a collapse of deviating regime 
(political fracture).
89
 The general ban will, however, hardly pass a proportionality test and will be in 
conflict with most of the other principles. 
3. Economic Rights 
Insulating sanctions (suspension of various rights to participate in the EU decision-making) are highly 
unlikely to change the objectionable behavior of a target state and would, if not combined with other 
sanctions, fail the effectiveness and the democracy-inbound principles. Suspension of economic rights, 
especially if targeting the economic base of the regime, can be more effective. 
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 The EP can use its ‘power of consent’ in order to negotiate with the Commission its proposal for sanctions. The EP has a 
considerable experience with using this strategy. 
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The EU has two major options regarding economic sanctions that fulfil the definition of suspension 
of rights derived from the Treaties – suspension of free movement rights and suspension of EU 
funds.
90
 Both options can be used in a targeted way.  
Several scholars suggested to apply economic sanctions outside the Article 7 framework. Jan-
Werner Müller’s recommends to create a Copenhagen Commission empowered to investigate the 
situation of fundamental values breach. Based on the findings of the Copenhagen Commission, the 
European Commission will be required, for instance, to cut EU funds or impose significant fines.
91
 In 
theory, there is no reason to consider an investigation conducted by the European Commission to be 
biased, so that a new institution would be required. As I argued above, the Commission may use the 
expertise of the Fundamental Rights Agency to gather and analyze evidence of the values breach. 
Article 7 does not allow imposing outright fines, since the sanction must be a suspension of a certain 
right and for such an option, a new mechanism would have to be created as Müller suggests. 
The experience with fines imposed by Court of Justice for non-compliance with its judgment 
regarding the infringement of Treaties shows that Member States are able to stall the payments for 
decades. If one considers that it takes about nine years from the infringement action to the Court’s 
decision imposing fines, then the ineffectiveness of the procedure is alarming.
92
 It can be assumed that 
if fines are imposed, through whatever procedure, for a fundamental values breach (meaning there is a 
deep structural problem in the Member State in question), it will be self-defeating for the EU as the 
target state will just ignore it. The solution might be to deduct the fines from EU funds allocated to 
that Member State. 
The infringement proceeding, supposing the fines for non-compliance with the judgment are 
imposed immediately after a reasonable deadline for correction of the infringement expires, has not 
proved to be a good venue. The reasons are a limitation of the Court as to what its judgment can 
achieve, but more importantly there has been a hesitation of the Court to be dragged into internal 
politics of a Member State and forced to evaluate the constitutional framework of such Member State.
 
93
 The court can be forced to deal with the problem directly (and not through proxy issues) if 
infringement of Article 2 TEU is pled. Kim Lane Scheppele argued for rephrasing the infringement 
procedure to provide for an option of systemic infringement actions that would bundle several 
violations and use Article 2 TEU or Article 4 TEU (sincere cooperation) in connection with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as their basis.
94
 However, as unfortunate as it might be that Article 7 
TEU is cumbersome due to the unanimity requirement in its key stage, the constitutional legislator 
opted for this option. It cannot be bypassed without good reason. 
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Suspending payments from EU funds to a Member State found in breach of fundamental values 
under Article 7 is the preferred way.
95
 In order to increase the effectiveness of this sanction and 
subsequently pass the proportionality test, I suggest targeted sanctions. Firstly, the Commission as 
preferred initiator of Article 7 procedure will deconstruct a target regime’s political and economic 
structure and identify key individuals and entities. Then, the EU will, instead of paying the funds to 
the state and the state redistributing the funds based on calls for concrete projects within announced 
funding programs, temporarily fund concrete programs directly based on applications from individuals 
and entities and will not approve any funding for blacklisted individuals and entities.
96
 
A suspension of free movement rights can assume various forms. It shall be again targeted. For 
instance, export of blacklisted entities can be subjected to the common tariff set for third countries. 
Free movement of services provided by blacklisted entities can be limited by the condition that the 
service provider must be incorporated in a Member State that is not subject to Article 7 sanctions. 
Certifications of quality may be required to fulfil requirements of a Member State in which it is 
marketed. Workers from a sanctioned Member State can be required to apply for a working permit. 
The EU rights of posted workers can be suspended. Free movement of finances may be restricted.  
The EU can also refuse guarantees for European Investment Bank’s loans to a sanctioned state. It 
may deny a right of targeted individuals to buy property in another Member State, etc. 
4. Other Rights 
Suspension of other than political and economic rights may include a suspension of automatic 
recognition of judicial decisions in other Member States. This option falls within the insulating 
category of sanctions. A Member States’ tempering with the domestic judiciary raises the question of 
legitimacy of all judicial outcomes and their possible effect on nationals in other Member States. The 
Council may also suspend the recognition of qualifications if education institutions, their curriculum, 
research, and staff is corrupted by ideological views of a Member State found in breach of 
fundamental values.  
The Council can further suspend the rights deriving from the Schengen acquis. Targeted 
individuals may be banned from traveling to other EU states or be subject to an administrative 
procedure of a type of granting a visa. However, effective enforcement of such sanctions would 
require reinstating border controls, which may be disproportionate. 
Further research shall focus on possibilities of direct financial assistance to independent media, 
non-government-controlled universities, opposition parties, and civil society advocates, which would 
fall within the ‘suspension of rights’ condition of Article 7. Direct distribution of EU funds 
(constructed as selective suspension of a right to EU funds) might be an option for some of the 
institutions mentioned. 
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 The requirement that a Member State must co-finance a funded project would be suspended as well. This solution will 
allow the EU to channel the funds into projects that are able to reform the structural conditions necessary for Article 2 
TEU values to function. 
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Conclusion: From Voting Rights Suspension to Tailored Sanctions 
The Union failed and it is failing again. Creeping deviation of an entire region from liberal-
democratic, common values is not a coincidence. The two most visible proponents, PiS and Fidesz, 
have stopped pretending to cherish these values, and declared that they want to restructure their 
political, economic, and social structures on a different political philosophy. Both parties command 
electoral majorities. If they continue winning future elections, they will secure a loyal constitutional 
court, presidency, central bank, media, and universities through their appointment and funding powers 
in a less contestable way. The case of Hungary has already proven that to some extent. But in the 
shadows of the excesses of Hungary’s and Poland’s legislatures stands the rest of Eastern Enlargement 
states with few exceptions. We should ask why Viktor Orbán has turned from a liberal to his current 
self and why so many others in the region follow the suit. But first the trend must be stopped and the 
EU must prove to its citizens that the fundamental values are indeed fundamental, warranting the 
imposition of Article 7 sanctions. 
The Commission, assuming the role of prosecutor in the Article 7 procedure, should in cooperation 
with the Council and the European Parliament focus on devising such sanction mix, which effects 
enhances the possibility of public to realize the danger of an illiberal turn and liberal forces to take 
over. Insulating sanctions, such as the suspension of voting rights, are unable to fulfil this aim. 
Sanctions should not target an entire Member State but focus on selected individuals and entities. They 
should be like a surgical intervention, carefully cutting away those parts of political and economic 
structures that underpin the regime. Simultaneously, the EU must be careful not to create a space for 
other illiberal states to step in to fill the commercial gap caused by sanctions and the political vacuum 
that might result from a backlash of sanctioned state against the EU and its Member States.
97
 
The first step requires a proper diagnosis of deviation. In the second step, the EU must ask what 
measures can remedy the roots of the deviation. In the third step, it must find concrete options in the 
EU legal order (rights to be suspended) that can fulfil this goal. In the next step, it must combine the 
rights selected for suspension into a complex sanction regime, tailored to the causes of deviation and 
political and economic structure of the Member State in breach. Finally, the EU must test the devised 
sanction regime against the democracy-inbound, effectiveness, proportionality (general and special), 
and beneficiary-focus principles and correct the sanction regime accordingly.  
A use of proper theory is, from a legal point of view, required by not only the effectiveness 
principle, but also the other three principles. Gramscian analysis of state-society relationship offers a 
valuable assistance to senders of sanctions in isolating the forces that are vital for the state elite to stay 
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